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Laboratory experiments have always been im-
portant in psychology and are as commonly used 
today as ever due to the dominating position of 
cognitive research in international psychology. 
This trend has been further strengthened by re-
cent developments in cognitive neuroscience, 
where experimental studies are central. Recently, 
experimental studies within the ﬁ eld of affective 
neuroscience have also received attention. Not-
withstanding, experimental methods remain con-
troversial also in psychology, and one should ca-
refully weigh their advantages against their 
drawbacks.
Ever since psychology emerged as a separate scientifi c di-
scipline in the second half of the 19th century experimen-
tal methods have played a central, though often contro-
versial, role in the fi eld. For example, experiments like the 
infamous authority obedience experiment conducted by 
Milgram (Milgram 1963) as well as Zimbardo’s Stanford 
Prison Experiment (Haney et al. 1973) have substanti-
vely added to the ethical discussions about the use and 
misuse of experimental methods within political psycho-
logy (e.g., Baumrind 1964). In the cognitive branch of 
psychology, experiments have throughout history been 
the primary method of investigation. Cognitive psycho-
logy deals with basic mental functions such as memory, 
perception, and attention, and is arguably the most fun-
damental branch of psychology (e.g., Bundesen and Ha-
bekost 2008, Bundesen 1990, Posner 2011). Following 
the „cognitive revolution“ in the 1950s (for an histori-
cal account see Gardner 1985), the scientifi c paradigms 
developed for cognition research have been increasingly 
infl uential across psychology, and experimental methods 
are now also important in, for example, social, develop-
mental, and clinical psychology. Th e methodology and 
general approach of experimental psychology has also 
been combined very successfully with neuroscience, lea-
ding to the emergence of a new and highly active scienti-
fi c fi eld: cognitive neuroscience. Recently, also aff ective 
neuroscience has received increased attention (e.g., Da-
vidson et al. 2003, Davidson and Begley 2013, Ekman 
and Davidson 1994, Coan and Allen 2007). Th e fi eld of 
aff ective neuroscience also draws on laboratory experi-
ments as the main methodology to explore the aff ective 
sides of psychological processes, where a variety of sub-
designs within the laboratory experimental framework 
are applied (e.g., Coan and Allen 2007). 
In spite of its long-standing importance to many types 
of psychological research, the usefulness of experimental 
methods in psychology remains debated. In particular, 
there is an on-going discussion as to which psychological 
phenomena are suitable objects for the reductionist ap-
proach of experimental psychology (e.g., Uttal 2001). A 
related question concerns whether psychological and be-
havioral processes (including clinical disorders) are most 
appropriately studied at the individual or socio-cultural 
level. In this sense, the discussion of experimental met-
hods in psychology also have implications for other social 
sciences, including political science. 
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Th is article provides a brief overview of experimental 
methods in psychology, including descriptions of their 
basic principles and illustrative examples. Th e article fo-
cuses on the experimental method in its most pure form, 
the controlled laboratory study, and discusses the validity 
of this scientifi c approach in psychology. Furthermore, 
it provides an account of the recent combination of ex-
perimental methods with cognitive and aff ective neuro-
science.
Basic principles of experimental laboratory 
psychology
Th e central rationale behind the controlled experiment is 
the same in psychology as in the natural sciences, from 
where the method was taken: One seeks to isolate and 
manipulate specifi c independent variables in order to 
cause changes in specifi c dependent variables, which are 
then carefully measured (e.g., Wilson et al. 2010, Mor-
ton and Williams 2010). One simple example could be 
an experiment where a letter is shown very briefl y on a 
computer screen and the participant’s task is to report the 
identity of the letter (Habekost and Starrfelt 2009). In the 
basic version of this experiment, one investigates the re-
lation between the length of the exposure time (the inde-
pendent variable) and the probability that the participant 
perceives the letter (the dependent variable). In a more 
elaborate version of the experiment one might investigate 
how performance varies between participants with dif-
ferent psychological properties, for example, depending 
on age or general intelligence. Alternatively, one might 
consider psychological variation within participants, for 
example, comparing diff erent test sessions to see how 
performance develops with practice (Habekost, Petersen 
and Vangkilde 2014). Psychological experiments are al-
ways conducted in a theoretical context, which provides 
guidance to the selection of independent and dependent 
variables, relevant hypotheses about their relations, and 
general interpretations of the data (e.g., Dickson 2011). 
Th e example described before might clarify aspects of vi-
sual form recognition, such as limitations in the speed of 
visual information processing, and how these cognitive 
processes interact with other factors such as the partici-
pant’s age or ability to learn.
In laboratory experiments confounding infl uences 
from other factors are reduced by conducting the inve-
stigations in a highly controlled physical and social env-
ironment. Th e setting typically includes fi xed procedures 
for the interaction between experimenter and partici-
pant (operationalized in a set of standard instructions), 
a physical environment that is approximately equal for 
all participants (e.g., in terms of lighting or sound levels), 
a systematic time course of the experiment (e.g., fully 
randomized or counterbalanced sequences of trials), and 
restricted pre-defi ned modes of response for the partici-
pant (Kantowitz, Roediger and Elms 2009). 
Th is high degree of standardization brings about im-
portant advantages, but also has its drawbacks.1 A major 
advantage is that the controlled procedures allow for di-
rect replication of the results, a traditional cornerstone 
of good science. Given the method section from a pub-
lished experimental study, it is straightforward to set up 
a similar study anywhere else in the world to test the 
reliability of the original results. Th is way the reliability 
of the fi ndings can be checked. Another main advantage 
of the experimental approach is a high level of internal va-
lidity. Provided that the experiment is properly designed 
and conducted, one can be relatively sure that the factors 
manipulated in the experiment, rather than theoretically 
irrelevant processes, actually caused the observed changes 
in the dependent variables. Th is provides a conceptual 
precision that is extremely valuable for theoretical de-
velopment (e.g., to devise models that distinguish sharply 
between diff erent aspects of attentional function: Bunde-
sen and Habekost 2014).
However, the isolation of particular psychological 
processes in the laboratory also entails a risk of redu-
cing the phenomenon of interest to something less mea-
ningful. Th e dilemma can be illustrated by an example. 
Suppose one is interested in visual search, the ability to 
locate a particular object in a visual scene. Ultimately, one 
is aiming to understand the psychological mechanisms 
involved in a complex real-life situation like looking for 
a particular person while standing in a busy street with 
many distractions. Th eoretically, many diff erent factors 
may infl uence this visual search process: particularly sa-
lient colors or forms may attract attention, the number 
or the location of the distracting objects may be impor-
tant, prior learning experience and emotional state could 
also be relevant, and so on. Th ese factors are all simul-
taneously active in the busy street, which makes it very 
diffi  cult to conclude something specifi c from observing 
people’s behavior in this situation. 
Th e experimental approach off ers a way of disentang-
ling the infl uence of all these factors by singling out par-
ticular ones for study in the laboratory. For example, the 
infl uence of color can be studied by varying this factor sy-
stematically, while keeping all other factors constant. In 
another line of experiments, one might instead focus on 
the infl uence of emotional states, and so on. Th e question 
is then to what extent results obtained in the laboratory 
can be integrated with each other and generalized back to 
the real-life situation; whether the experimental study has 
„ecological validity“ (Morton and Williams 2010, 253-
275). Th is is generally diffi  cult to determine, as one can-
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not merely rely on a superfi cial impression of whether the 
experimental task „seems similar“ to the real-life process 
or not (whether it has „face validity“). In some cases, one 
might have relevant evidence to estimate the ecological 
validity of the measure, for example if there is a reliable 
relation between an experimental test score and some 
measure of real-life performance (e.g., the ability to drive 
a car safely). However, such evidence can be ambiguous 
and in many cases simply be lacking. 
A diff erent approach is to assume that psychological 
theories provide the necessary ecological validity, since 
they address general psychological mechanisms. In this 
view, the purpose of laboratory experiments is not to mi-
mic real-life situations, but to test particular predictions 
of theories. Because the theories have general scopes and 
should hold across many situations, it should also be pos-
sible to falsify or confi rm their predictions in a laboratory 
setting. From this perspective, it matters less that an ex-
perimental task may seem to be a reduced version of the 
phenomenon in question, because the laboratory fi ndings 
can still test the validity of a theory that speaks to general 
psychological questions.   
Another fundamental question in experimental psy-
chology concerns whether to investigate a few individuals 
in great detail or rather to examine large groups of people 
by more coarse measures. If a psychological process is 
assumed to function in a highly similar manner across 
healthy adult individuals (for the uniformity hypothesis 
see Coltheart 2002), it makes good sense to investigate its 
details very precisely in a small group of participants, and 
then generalize the fi ndings to the whole population. Th is 
is, for example, often assumed for basic sensory processes, 
where individual participants are typically investigated 
very extensively for detailed analyses of their perceptual 
mechanisms (e.g., Petersen and Andersen 2012). Th e 
case-based approach is also common in more applied 
parts of psychology, for example in cognitive neuropsy-
chology, where many of the great discoveries on brain-
behavior relationships were originally based on studies 
of single patients with brain damage. For example, the 
fundamental role of the hippocampus for memory pro-
cesses was fi rst revealed by studies of patient H.M., who 
suff ered a severe memory loss after his hippocampus was 
operationally removed in both sides of the brain (Scoville 
and Milner 1957). Such neuropsychological fi ndings have 
since been confi rmed in many individuals, and generally 
one seeks to combine the analytical depth and precision 
of single case studies with the representativeness obtained 
by studying large groups of people.
Two examples: accuracy and response time in 
psychological experiments
Th e two main dependent variables (outcome measures) 
used in experimental psychology are accuracy and response 
time (Ashcraft and Radvansky 2013). Th e outcome mea-
sures often have limited interest in themselves, but repre-
sent ways of testing models of the underlying psychologi-
cal processes. In more advanced cases these psychological 
models take mathematical form, which enables highly 
specifi c hypothesis testing. Starting with accuracy, this is 
a measure of the correctness versus failure of a particular 
mental process. As an example of an accuracy based ex-
periment, consider a task where six unrelated letters are 
fl ashed on a computer screen for a brief period of time 
(e.g., 50 ms). Th e participant’s task is to report as many 
of the letters as possible (whole report; Habekost and Star-
rfelt 2009). If the task is repeated a suffi  cient number of 
times, and the exposure duration is systematically varied 
from near-threshold to ceiling performance, the mean 
number of correctly reported letters (i.e., accuracy) de-
velops as a function of exposure time in a characteristic 
fashion: At very low exposure durations accuracy is zero, 
then the score starts to rise abruptly, followed by a gradual 
leveling of the accuracy curve to approach an asympto-
tic maximum that is typically between three and four 
letters. Shibuya and Bundesen (1988) showed that this 
performance pattern can be very closely modeled by an 
exponential function that includes three parameters: the 
visual processing speed C, the storage capacity of visual 
short-term memory K, and the perception threshold t0. 
Th e original analysis of Shibuya and Bundesen was ba-
sed on many hours of testing just two participants, but 
has since been validated in numerous studies involving 
thousands of people, also individuals with brain damage 
or psychiatric disturbances. Th e processes involved in the 
whole report task can be understood by a general model 
of attention (the TVA model is found in Bundesen 1990, 
Bundesen and Habekost 2008), where selection of visual 
information for conscious perception is viewed as a race 
between all elements in the visual fi eld, and capacity li-
mitations such as the C and K parameters are crucial for 
the outcome.
Th e other main dependent variable in experimental 
psychology, response time, represents a sum of all pro-
cesses between stimulus and response. Typically one is 
not interested in the overall response time but rather in 
how specifi c psychological processes contribute to cer-
tain parts of it. To reach such conclusions, sophisticated 
designs and analysis of the experiments are necessary. 
Sternberg (1969) developed an experimental design that 
is regarded as a classical example of response time ana-
lysis. As in the previous example, the experimental task 
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is simple (Sternberg 1969). Th e participant must memo-
rize a small set of letters (either 2, 3, 4, or 5 items), this 
time shown for so long time on the computer screen that 
perceptual limitations are not a problem for solving the 
task. Th e letter set is then held in mind and followed by 
a probe letter on the screen. Th e task is simply to deter-
mine as rapidly as possible whether the probe letter was 
in the memory set (which is the case for 50% of the trials, 
randomly intermixed). Th is task requires effi  cient mental 
search of the items held in mind, and the purpose of the 
experiment is to elucidate the way this search process is 
carried out. It turns out that the mean response time is 
a strictly linear function of the number of letters in the 
memory set. Sternberg interpreted this as evidence that 
participants mentally search through the memory set in 
a serial fashion, that is one letter at a time, rather than 
process all letters in the memory set simultaneously to 
determine if there is a match to the probe. 
Th is serial search hypothesis is consistent with the 
fact that response time increases with a constant number 
of milliseconds for each item in the memory set (i.e., 
linearly). Further, Sternberg noted that the slope of the li-
near function was similar regardless of whether the probe 
was in the memory set or not. Sternberg took this as an 
indication that, contrary to intuition, the mental search is 
performed in an exhaustive rather than a self-terminating 
manner. Th at is, the participant continues the mental 
search of the memory set even though the probe letter is 
recognized during the process, and therefore the search 
is not performed any faster if a match is present or not. 
Th ese very clear results have been replicated numerous 
times, although other psychological mechanisms than 
described in Sternberg’s original model have since been 
proposed to account for the pattern of response times.
Unfortunately, these elegant mathematical models 
are seldom able to account for more complex psycho-
logical processes where strategic factors, such as choices 
between diff erent ways of solving the task, and response 
complexity (e.g., hundreds of eye movements during a 
search task) produce so many degrees of freedom that 
the performance pattern can no longer be modeled with 
mathematical precision. However, such psychological 
processes can still be modeled in more general, quali-
tative terms, and these models can also be subjected to 
hypothesis-based experimental testing.
Experimental psychology and cognitive 
neuroscience
Th e experimental approach to psychological processes has 
its roots in the natural sciences. It is therefore no won-
der that it is highly compatible with the most relevant 
parts of the natural sciences, namely the neurosciences, 
which study the biology of the brain (e.g., Gazzaniga et 
al. 2009). In the fi eld of cognitive neuroscience combined 
measurements are made of behavioral performance on a 
psychological task and some brain property, for example, 
blood fl ow in specifi c regions of the cortex (Jezzard, 
Matthews and Smith 2001), electrical activity in large 
populations of neurons (Luck 2005), or the anatomical 
location of a brain lesion (Damasio and Damasio 1989). 
Th is way one can obtain direct correlations between a 
well-defi ned psychological process (isolated by the experi-
mental task) and particular aspects of brain function. Th e 
scientifi c power of this cross-disciplinary approach has 
become very evident in the last few decades, where the 
neural correlates of more and more psychological proces-
ses have been put under scrutiny by sophisticated techni-
cal methods: magnetic resonance scanning of blood fl ow 
patterns, mathematical modelling of electrophysiological 
activity in the cortex, magnetic and electric stimulation 
of particular brain areas, and many more (e.g., Purves et 
al. 2013). Th is has led to many remarkable discoveries 
about how basic mental processes depend on specifi c 
parts of the brain. For example, measurements of single 
neurons in the visual cortex have shown that changes in 
their electrical activity with diff erent attentional states 
can be described using the same mathematical equati-
ons that apply to the psychological behavior of the whole 
organism (Bundesen, Habekost and Kyllingsbæk 2005). 
Th e scope of these mind-brain investigations, which 
initially focused on elementary cognitive processes (e.g., 
visual perception) have widened greatly in recent years 
and now include topics drawn from all over the huma-
nistic and social sciences. For example, inspired by the 
scientifi c success of the core parts of cognitive neuro-
science, researchers are now studying the neural basis of 
phenomena as diverse and psychologically complex as 
religious beliefs (e.g., Haidt 2012), aesthetic experiences 
(dio Cinzia and Vittorio 2009), and electoral voting pat-
terns (Amodio, Jost, Master and Yee 2007). Empirical 
progress has, however, been more limited in many of 
these fi elds, raising the question of how far the cognitive 
neuroscience paradigms can be applied. Central to this 
discussion is the question of what mental and behavioral 
processes can be captured by the highly individualistic 
approach of the controlled psychological experiment.
Experimental psychology and aff ective 
neuroscience 
Recently, experimental research has also been widely used 
within the emerging fi eld of aff ective neuroscience (e.g., 
Davidson et al. 2003, Davidson and Begley 2013, Ek-
man and Davidson 1994, LeDoux 2003). As a sign of this 
trend, the American Psychological Association in 2001 
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founded a scientifi c journal aiming at aff ective research 
called Emotions. Along similar lines as in cognitive neu-
roscience, the study of aff ective psychological processes 
has also benefi tted tremendously by merging it with the 
latest fi ndings from neuroscience. It is important to note 
that aff ective science is more than mere studies of emo-
tions. Aff ective science distinguishes between six major 
aff ective phenomena and encompasses emotions, feelings, 
moods, attitudes, aff ective styles and temperament (Sche-
rer and Peper 2001). Yet, importantly, these six aff ective 
phenomena are to be understood as a catalogue of the 
most frequently study areas within aff ective science, not 
an exhaustive list (Davidson et al. 2003, xiii). 
Similarly, cognitive and aff ective neuroscience are also 
not to be understood as separate sciences. Th e distinction 
between aff ect and cognition dates back to Plato’s philo-
sophical discussions, where he understood emotions to 
be in direct opposition to cognition. Yet, recent research 
has shown that the two processes rather should be seen 
as complimentary than as adversaries. And, increasingly, 
psychological experimental research explores the interac-
tion between cognition and emotion to study the dyna-
mics of, for example, the processes of memory, judgment 
and decision-making (e.g., Scherer 2003, 563). Th e ex-
ploration of interactions between aff ective and bodily 
processes were pioneered and popularized by Antonio 
Damasio, who challenged two central tenets within neu-
roscience; fi rst, the tendency to study the brain and body 
separately, and, second, the predominant understanding 
of rationality as something separate and distinct from 
emotions (Burkitt 2014, 79, Damasio 1994).
Th ese ontological insights have provided the basis 
for a new research agenda, focusing not only on the ex-
ploration of aff ective processes in themselves, but also 
providing grounds for studies on the interaction between 
aff ective and cognitive processes. Th ese studies have pro-
vided insights into the role of emotions on, for example, 
attitudes and judgments (e.g., Forgas 2003) as well as the 
role of emotions in decision making (e.g., Loewenstein 
and Lerner 2003) to mention a  few examples. Central to 
these fi ndings are their added value in a political science 
perspective, as they shed light on the role of emotions 
when individuals make political decisions or interact in 
the broader political society. Still, in order to generalise 
these fi ndings to broader political and/or societal discus-
sions, which characterises political science as an academic 
fi eld, we also need to explore these individual level af-
fective processes in a social and contextual perspective. 
Individual versus social perspectives on psycholo-
gical processes
Th e perhaps most common criticism of experimental psy-
chology holds that it is problematic to study humans inde-
pendently of cultural and social context, as it is attempted 
in the controlled laboratory setting. Th is is, for example, 
a central statement of the so-called critical psychology 
movement, which was founded in the 1970s and draws 
heavily on Marxist theory (e.g., Holzkamp 1983). Critical 
psychology was quite infl uential in Danish psychology in 
the last decades of the 20th century, whereas the impact 
on international psychology has been limited. Regardless 
of the relevance of Marxist perspectives in psychology, 
the general point about the importance of socio-cultural 
factors on human behavior remains important and has 
also been advocated from many other sides in the social 
sciences (e.g., Heine 2010). 
While it is obvious that human beings are inherently 
social, and that cultural infl uences are pervasive in our 
lives, it seems equally clear that many psychological pro-
cesses, for example our abilities to perceive, think, and 
remember, can be meaningfully studied at the individual 
level. Th e remarkable empirical progress achieved in cog-
nitive and aff ective neuroscience also bears witness to 
the fact that (at least some) psychological processes can 
be well studied at the level of the individual organism. 
Still, one of the most important roles of psychological 
processes is „…their regulatory function in relationships, 
social interaction, and group organization..“ (Davidson et 
al. 2003, xiv). Or, in brief, their relevance for the socio-
political environment in which the studied phenomena 
take place. 
Within the recent explorations in psychology and 
neuroscience, there have been attempts to include the so-
cial aspect of aff ective phenomena with the development 
of the nascent fi eld of social neuroscience (e.g., Cacioppo 
et al. 2000, Lieberman 2007, Heatherton and Wheatley 
2010). Th is is where cognitive and aff ective neuroscience 
becomes relevant for political science. Th e core of politi-
cal science is defi ned by the study of phenomena relevant 
to understand the political system and society – i.e. the 
interaction between individuals in a broader societal set-
ting, and with the particular focus to understand the 
occurrence of politically relevant phenomena better. Th is 
has been the aim of social psychology for many years, 
for example, when exploring intergroup relations (e.g., 
Tajfel 1982). With the introduction of neuroscience into 
the fi elds of aff ection and cognition, experimental met-
hods have reached a new cross-disciplinary way to provide 
insights into the psychological dimensions of political 
science.   
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Th us, rather than arguing about the necessity of 
socio-cultural perspectives on psychological processes 
in general, it seems more fruitful to evaluate the mat-
ter relative to each particular phenomenon one wants to 
study. When we are dealing with elementary mechanisms 
of cognitive functions such as perception, attention, and 
memory, which seem to depend on brain circuits that are 
common to all members of the human race, the indivi-
dually oriented perspective of experimental psychology 
is on fi rm grounds. It is less clear how the infl uence of 
cultural diff erences and social context can be handled for 
some of the more complex processes that have recently en-
tered the focus of experimental psychology and cognitive 
or aff ective neuroscience. Is it, for example, justifi ed to 
investigate a person’s social behavior and preferences in a 
magnetic resonance scanner, where the person lies immo-
bilized and alone while carrying out a task that is entirely 
determined by the experimental design? In cases such as 
these, one should be careful to weigh the advantages of 
the rigorous experimental method against the drawbacks 
of its reductionism.
Conclusion
Unlike mainstream political science, laboratory experi-
ments have been a core tool in psychological research for 
many decades. Th ough experiments as a method are not 
without serious shortcomings and pitfalls, they simulta-
neously provide insights into psychological processes that 
are hard to observe using other kinds of methodologies. 
Th is article has accounted for the basic rationale behind 
laboratory experiments in psychological research as well 
as pointed to the reductionist pitfalls inherently present in 
the individual level experimental measurement. Further-
more, the article has described recent developments in 
the fi eld of cognitive neuroscience as well as the even 
newer evolution of the fi eld of aff ective neuroscience. We 
have emphasised that the current tendency to combine 
fi ndings from neuroscience with psychological research 
has provided new and pioneering knowledge, also to the 
psychological fi elds of most interest to political scientists. 
Yet, we urge researchers to remain aware of the limitati-
ons of experimental methods and not limit their conclu-
sions to the individual perspective. 
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